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Abstract 
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mix of extraordinary conditions have been crucial for the origin, develop and growth of the 
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Introduction: an overview of the crisis
In this paper we present an interpretation of the economic and financial cri-
sis that considers fundamental several issues. It is well known that in finding
the real causes of the so called “sub-prime crisis”, we can easily notice that
there is no general and unique consensus on what were the key drivers of
the global demand collapse in these last quarters. On one side researchers
investigate and concentrate studies focused on the financial markets turmoil,
they explain this big stop in the global demand as a consequence of the pres-
ence of fear and uncertainty in the capital markets. On the other side there
is a general consensus that a major role has been played by the collapse in
the world trade. Recent publications also try to understand and explain the
global crisis by focusing on the real market and assessing the crucial role
of the credit tightening linked to the beginning of a big amount potential
foreclosure, mainly due to the increase of the interest rate. In order to incor-
porate all these elements, other research projects investigate on the possible
merger between the above mentioned causes, thus the financial shock, the
global trade collapse and the credit tightening impacts, so as to capture
all the effects on the global economy as a whole. As a matter of fact the
past/current economic and financial crisis has been characterized by waves
of successive external shocks over the short space of three years. It started
with house price and stock market declines in 2007, spikes in food and en-
ergy prices in mid-2008 further collapses in stock markets and contraction in
credit markets in late 2008, and a slump in world demand in 2009. Each of
the above mentioned point impacted negatively on global demand over the
past three years. Before to enter in the details of our analysis, we think that
an overview of the origins and causes of the economic and financial crisis is
needed. Primarily a chronology of the crisis, here below represented, could
be useful.
2000-2001 US Federal Reserve lowers Federal funds rate 11
times, from 6.5% (May 2000) to 1.75% (Decem-
ber 2001), creating an easy-credit environment
that fueled the growth of US subprime mort-
gages
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2002-2006 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac combined pur-
chases of incorrectly rated AAA subprime
mortgage-backed securities rise from $38 billion
to $90 billion per year. Lenders began to offer
loans to higher-risk borrowers, including illegal
immigrants. Subprime mortgages amounted to
$600 billion by 2006.
Feb-07 US house prices start falling (nominal home
price index decreased by 9.5% in 2007) and sev-
eral subprime lenders report losses.
Jul-07 Credit spreads start to widen and home foreclo-
sures double from one year before
Aug-07 Worldwide “credit crunch” as subprime mort-
gage backed securities are discovered in portfo-
lios of banks and hedge funds around the world,
from BNP Paribas (it suspends three investment
funds that invested in subprime mortgage debt
due to a “complete evaporation of liquidity” in
the market) to Bank of China.
Aug-07 Federal Reserve injects about $100 billion and
ECB injects about 100bn into the money supply
for banks to borrow at a low rate.
Other financial institutions panic and stop in-
terbank lending.
Sep-07 to Jan-09 Fed funds rate cut 5 times (-2.25%) in order to
limit damage to the economy from the housing
and credit crises.
Nov-07 Reported bank losses on subprime assets =
US$150bn (rising to US400bn in March 2008).
Jan-2008 January 2008 stock market downturn.
Jan-08 to Feb-08 S&P downgrade about 8000 mortgage-based se-
curities. Bank credit growth stops. Swiss gi-
ant UBS and Fanny Mae record big unexpected
losses.
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Mar-08 Bear Sterns virtually insolvent. Bear Stearns is
acquired for $2 a share by JPMorgan Chase in a
fire sale avoiding bankruptcy. The deal is backed
by the Federal Reserve, providing up to $30B to
cover possible Bear Stearn losses.
Mar-08 to Apr-08 Deutsche Bank reports huge losses.
Twice FED lowers fed funds rate (-1%); coordi-
nates global cut.
Jun-08 US house prices falling faster in 2008 = -15%;
same fall in UK
US home foreclosures double again.
Jul-08 to Sep-08 FED guarantees debts of Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac. Treasury takes control with US$200bn
bailout.
14-Sep-08 Merrill Lynch is sold to Bank of America amidst
fears of a liquidity crisis and Lehman Brothers
collapse.
15-Sep-08 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy protec-
tion. Government allows it to fail.
16-Sep-08 Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s downgrade
ratings on AIG’s credit on concerns over contin-
uing losses to mortgage-backed securities, send-
ing the company into fears of insolvency
17-Sep-08 The US Federal Reserve lends $85 billion to
American International Group (AIG) to avoid
bankruptcy.
22-Sep-08 Last two Wall Street investment banks, Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs, convert to become
commercial banks.
25-Sep-08 Washington Mutual is seized by the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, and its banking as-
sets are sold to JP Morgan Chase for $1.9 billion.
29-Sep-08 British government capitalizes Bradford & Bing-
ley. Iceland government in 75% takeover of Glit-
nir bank.
2-Oct-08 Irish government guarantees bank deposits and
debts for US$554bn
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3-Oct-08 President George W. Bush signs the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act, creating a $700 bil-
lion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) to
purchase failing bank assets.
3-Oct-08 Wells Fargo bank and the fourth-largest US
bank Wachovia Corp announce merger.
Congress agrees to largest government in-
tervention in capital markets in US history
(US$700bn) debates bank ownership.
Dutch government buys Fortis for US$23 bn.
6-Oct-08 Fed announces that it will provide $900 billion
in short-term cash loans to banks.
6/10Oct-08 Worst week for the stock market in 75 years.
8-Oct-08 FED, Bank of Canada, ECB, Swiss coordinate
0.5% rate cut.
13-Oct-08 UK injects US$64 billion Royal Bank of Scot-
land, HBOS and Lloyds TSB.
14-Oct-08 The US taps into the $700 billion available from
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and
announces the injection of $250 billion of public
money into the US banking system.
19-Oct-08 South Korean rescue package-US$130bn for
banks.
Latest Australian government guarantees all deposits
at APRA-supervised banks. RBA cuts another
0.75% in November.
Table 1: Chronology of the crisis
Basically the origin of the current crisis in the financial markets can
be traced back to the set of incentives that were introduced in the public
policy stance to encourage and support a rapid expansion of credit with
the objective of avoid a probable deeper economic recessions, especially in
developed economies following the bursting of the dot.com bubble (some-
times also called I.T. bubble) and the geo-political instability due to the
9-11 terrorist attacks. To avoid a probable recession a quantitative easing
policy was implemented by the US Federal Reserve. Thus, a quick moving
to lower interest rates level started to produce a sort of cheap money envi-
ronment where the access to credit was popularly facilitated especially to
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those experiencing difficulties in the access of home ownership. A complex
institutional architecture centered first around two big financial institutions,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, was designed to promote access to mortgage
credit through implicit state guarantees, especially for individuals with low
incomes, therefore with a higher default risk (the so called sub-primes). The
easy access to credit market, as a consequence of low interest rates level, led
to an increasing demand in the real estate market,1 thus generating a bub-
ble. Once interest rates rose,2 the debt of each debtor increased and they
did not pay back such debt. A huge drope in the real-estate market pushed
house prices down. As a consequence the banks’ asset side value drammat-
ically decreased and financial sector began to creak.
Next sections will be used to provide an empirical general overview of the
main causes of the past/current economic and financial crisis. In section 1
we will investigate on the relationship between financial/stock markets and
real economic activity. On this issue a vast literature exist, we will confirm
the general consensus of a strong relationship between the two market but
we will also conclude that such a relationship does not hold at any time.
In section 2 we will discuss on the credit crunch, analyzing the consumer
credit and money stock measures time series and their implication on the
country production. Our aim will be the one to recognize a different behav-
ior respect to the past and understand the meaning of a gap that does not
find painless explanations.
In section 3 we will focus on the impact of the subprime and credit losses
on the global trade which can be defined as a proxy of the global wealth.
Considering the fact that in the last 20 years exports and imports between
countries have been raised in volume in an exponential way,3 we will prove
the relevance of this macroeconomic component.
In section 4 we will try to investigate on the effects of uncertainty shocks
on the credit market and on the real economic activity. To implement our
empirical analysis a specific volatility index will be used and a standard
econometric approach will be adopted.
In the last section, considering the crucial role played by the “credit avail-
ability” within this economic and financial crisis as a sort of monetary con-
1Note that banks risk level was very low. Banks were confident that, in case of default,
they could sell the asset (house) at higher price
2Note that from June, 2003 to June, 2006 Federal Reserve increased for 17 consecutive
times the federal funds rate (from 1.0% to 5.25%)
3Referring to this statement it is sufficient to think about the formation of cooperations
such as the WTO (World Trade Organization) and the NAFTA (North American Free
Trade Agreement).
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traction, we will try to define a suitable optimal monetary policy. In defining
this policy we will extend an existing theoretical framework on optimal mon-
etary policy under uncertainty to more than one parameters uncertainty. We
will also try to extend such a model including the effect of another global
player.
1 Revisiting financial markets and real economic
activity relationship
Figure 1: Source: Eurostat, Statistics Database (stock market capitalization
is calculated by multiplying the volume of shares quoted on the stock market
by their market value).
For many practitioners and researchers financial markets turmoil has
played a crucial role in this crisis, especially as amplifier of the global down-
turn. Before to enter in the core of our paper an overview on the impact of
financial markets shocks on the real economic activity is needed. It is well
known that the relation between the stock market returns/performances and
the real economic activity has attracted a considerable attention both in the
theoretical and empirical economic as well as financial literature. The aim of
this section is to revisit and investigate interrelationship between the stock
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market performance and the real economic activity. It is quite clear that the
recent financial crisis and associated global demand collapse experienced by
several advanced and emerging economies have increased the importance of
research on the links between stock market performance and real economic
activity. To give an idea of how financial market declined during the crisis
and its impact on real economic activity, figure 1 shows the behaviour of
the market US stock market capitalization, which represents the size and
performance of stock markets, and therefore important for private investor
capital in the economy, and the behaviour of the US Nominal Gross Domes-
tic Product.
Theoretical literature on this subject shows without any doubt that stock
prices are closely connected to real economic activity through a number of
different channels. There has been a substantial theoretical work on the
link between stock returns and economic growth. In their survey article,
Morck et al. (1990) determines the five main channels, through which stock
prices are connected to real economic activity, which arguably encompass
most of the main theories that have been put forward in this literature.
These established channels are related to the fact that firms and managers
base their investment decisions on information provided by the stock mar-
ket and the stock prices represent the present discounted value of all future
dividends. In literature, other studies have taken shape on the links be-
tween stock prices and real economic activity. Stock market performance
affects real economic activity through lowering the cost of mobilizing sav-
ings and thereby facilitating investment in the most productive technologies
(Greenwood and Smith, 1997). Mauro (2003) also suggests that through
the wealth channel, the stock price developments can have a major impact
on consumption pattern and in turn on economic growth. Levine and Zer-
vos (1996) conclude that the stock market supports economic growth by
providing liquid capital, risk management to investors, and information on
the movements of the economic fundamentals. On the other hand, several
authors have provided models which display conflicting predictions about
the stock market and economic growth relationship. Bhide (1993) argues
that stock market volatility may reduce investment efficiency, which in turn
leads to a negative impact on economic growth. Obstfeld (1994) indicates
that high financial market liquidity may increase investment returns and
thus decrease saving rate due to substitution effect and income effect, which
is unfavorable to the economic growth. Mauro (1995) finds that in case of
financial assets investment, the development of stock market will decrease
the public’s precautionary saving, which is also detrimental for economic
growth. There exist also a line of empirical studies on the link between
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stock prices/returns and output growth. An incomplete list of these studies
includes: Fama (1981,1990), Wahlroos and Berglund (1986), Mullins and
Wadhwani (1989), Schwert (1990), Canova and Nicolo (1995), Choi et al.
(1999), Doong (2001), and Mauro (2003). Each has found that stock returns
and various macroeconomic factors are, to varying degrees, correlated, using
either US or other international data. Some other studies, however, provide
evidence that stock market performance is not correlated with real economic
activity. Stock and Watson (1990, 1998), Biswanger (2000, 2004), Mao and
Mu (2007) argued that the stock price movements since early 1980’s cannot
be explained by fundamental factors implying that the link between stock
prices and real economic activity has broke down. The causality relationship
between stock returns and economic growth is also investigated in numerous
empirical studies. Fama (1990), Schwert (1990), Canova and Nicolo (1995),
Doong (2001), and Mauro (2003) conclude that an increase in stock market
returns is an indication of an increase in industrial production growth rates.
Dep. Variab: Log(Ind. Prod.)
Sample: 1928:11 2009:09
Included observations: 971
Variable Coeff. Std. Error t-Stat. P-value.
C -0.29 0.05 -6.03 0.00
Log(Dow Jones Ind.Avg. ) 0.56 0.01 79.85 0.00
R-squared 0.87
Adjusted R-squared 0.87
Table 2: Estimates of long-run cointegrating relationship (USA)
By using standard econometric approaches, such as the Engle-Granger
cointegration procedure,4 Granger causality test and the VAR methodol-
ogy,5 we figure out and partially confirm the causal relationship between
financial markets and real economic activitiy. It is well known that a
VAR model modelizes, in essence, the dynamic relationships existing be-
tween groups of variables chosen to characterize a particular economic phe-
4To test for cointegration between two or more non-stationary time series I(1), it simply
requires running an OLS regression, saving the residuals and then running the ADF test on
the residual to determine if it is stationary I(0). The time series are said to be cointegrated
if the residual is itself stationary I(0).
5Necessary condition for the VAR methodology implementation is the one of having
stationary time series which means series integrated of order one I(0).
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nomenon. As theory suggests, for stationary VARs,6 the impulse response
should die out to zero and the accumulated responses should asymptote to
some (non-zero) constant. VAR methodology has been used to investigate on
the dynamic relationships existing between financial markets (stock prices,
market capitalization and share price indexes) and real economic activity
(US industrial production).
Figure 2: VAR estimation of the impact of a Dow Jones Industrial Average
shock on US Industrial Production growth rate. Notes: Dashed lines are 1
standard-error bands around the response to a Dow Jones Industrial Average
shock (data sample: 1928:11M-2009:09M).
Estimates results based on the Engle-Granger cointegration test7 and on
the Granger Causality test8 prove the presence of a long run relationship
and a short-run influence of one variable on the other, between the US Dow
Jones Industrial Average Stock Index and the US Industrial Production.
Thus the linear combination between two series integrated of order one I(1)
is stationary I(0)9 and the null hypothesis that Dow Jones Industrial Average
growth rate does not Granger cause the Industrial Production growth rate
6Note that estimating a VAR in first differences would remove important information
about the behavior of the variables that is contained in the common trend. So we often
use the growth rate of our variables which are often stationary processes.
7if yt and xt are both I(1) and yt = α+ βxt + t where t = yt − α− βxt ≈ I(0), then
yt and xt are said to be cointegrated
8The selection of the lag lenghts for the Granger Causality test is determined based on
the Alkaike Information Criterion (AIC).
9Results of the ECM residuals are illustrated in appendix A.1.
9
is rejected (1% confidence level, see table 3).10
Lags: 13
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat. P-value
DJIA does not Granger Cause Ind. Prod. 958 9.82 0.00
Ind. Prod. does not Granger Cause DJIA 958 1.25 0.24
Table 3: Granger Causality Test, 1928:11-2009:09 (USA)
Figure 2 displays the impulse response functions for the growth rate of
the US Industrial Production Index. The results indicated that the US In-
dustrial Production Index a stock price shock then decline starting from
the fourth month and a positive effect is statistically significance up to five
months. Generally speaking we may conclude that real economic activity
react positively to the innovations in the stock market returns. It is also
remarkable and important to notice that even if the economic and financial
crisis finds its origin in the US, the literature has provided clear and robust
evidence for international equity market linkages. More precisly exists a
strong notion that financial markets have become increasingly globally inte-
grated over the past decade. One important facet of financial integration is
that asset prices exhibit substantial co-movements internationally, therefore
there is clear evidence for positive correlation among global stock markets
(see table 4).
Basically, a US stock market shock impacts on other international stock
markets. In studying the relationship among equity markets Agmon (1972)
shows that the behaviour of share prices in four different country (United
States, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan) is consistent with the one
market hypothesis. Agmon also shows that changes in the three non-US
countries respond immediately to price changes in the US market index.
Cheol and Sangdal (1989) demonstrate that innovations in the US stock
market are rapidly trasmitted to other markets in a clearly recognizable
fashion, whereas no single foreign market can significantly explain the US
stock market movements. Hamao, Maulis and Ng (1992) shows that the US
stock market is found to be the the most influential in terms of its impact
on the performance of foreign markets. To further confirm such a global
domino effect, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) find that the trasmission of
10On the Granger Causality test power a wide literature exists. Christiano and
Ljungqvist (1988) found that the power of test on growth variables is very low, and thus
there is the danger of making false inference. Hofer and Kutan (1997) denoted that the
instability of results in Granger Causality test simply depends on the question whether
the variables are modelled as trend or as difference stationary.
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Stock Index S&P 500 S&P 500
Period (Jan 94 - Mar 10) (Jan 07 - Mar 10)
S&P 500 1.00 1.00
FTSE 100 0.81 0.88
DAX 0.78 0.91
CAC 40 0.76 0.91
IBEX 35 0.71 0.83
SMI 0.71 0.85
NIKKEI 225 0.54 0.76
HANG SENG 0.66 0.74
SING INDEX 0.63 0.83
IBOVESPA 0.46 0.79
Table 4: Global Stock Indeces - Correlation Coefficients
US monetary policy shocks is very similar in strenght and nature to the
general equity market linkage between the US and foreign markets on days
when no monetary policy decisions take place. In appendix 7.2 we present
some empirical analysis to partially prove this domino effect between US
stock market and other global stock markets. Our results, based on a set
of standard regression equations,11 show that of the eight non-US stock
markets the movements of stock index in Japan are the less closely related to
those of the US. In terms of their relationship with the US stock market the
French, the German, the Spanish, the English, the Swiss, the Brazilian and
the Chinese are very similar. In addition the R2 and the β′s are significantly
high.
So far we have seen that theoretical literature provides conflicting results
on the causal relationship between financial markets (stock prices, market
capitalization and share price indexes) and real economic activity. Due to
the fact that it does not exist a strong and unique framework about this
important relationship we can not conclude that the recent global demand
collapse leads exclusively to a US stock prices decline.
2 Credit Crunch: Why was it so decisive?
Following recent literature and conditional on an idea of no housing price
decline, where most subprime mortgages appeared relatively riskless, we can
state that the roots of the above mentioned scenario were initially created
11yi = αi + βi + i
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by the US house prices market decline. In assessing the role played by
the credit conditions within this crisis we need first to quantify the losses
arising from mortgage asset alone (in particular in the subprime sector) and
second access the impact of such losses on broader credit condition in the
US economy . The uncertainty, a subject that will follow us throughout this
paper, has been crucial also at the beginning of this collapse. In fact at the
time to compute the quantity of losses on subprime mortgages there was
uncertainty in the number to publish. In July 2007 fed chairman Bernanke
noted that losses of subprime mortgages could total $50-$100 billion. But by
the end of 2007 most mortgages credit modelers believed that total losses will
be substantially higher. For example, by December 2007, Lehman Brothers
(2007) was estimating that credit losses on the currently outstanding stock
of mortgages will total $250 billion in their baseline scenario of a 15% peak
to trough on price drop and $320 billion in a stress scenario with a 30%
drop. Similarly, as off late November Goldman Sachs (2007) was estimating
mortgages losses of $243 billion in their baseline scenario and $495 billion
in a stress scenario. Table 5, based on Goldman Sachs estimation, shows
the global subprime mortgages exposures.1213 It would now be very useful
to understand how an initial shock off roughly $200 billion to the leveraged
intermediary sector might cause the type of turmoil faced by the global
economy in these last quarters. The aftermath of this situation has been the
amplification of the random components within the markets (credit markets,
stock markets, trade markets). This created multiple problems over the
whole financial system such as share prices falling (especially banks), higher
market based interest rates due to credit default risk premium, reduced
credit supply and distressed investments bank going bankrupt.
In assessing the role of global financial-credit conditions, considering the
absence of reliable data on “global” financial and credit conditions, three
proxies have been used. The first series is the average between large and
medium firms of the percentage of banks reporting a tightening in credit
on commercial and industrial loans to large and medium sized firms, minus
the percentage reposting a loosening, taken from the US Federal Reserve
Bank Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey. The second proxy used is the
12Note: The total for U.S. commercial banks includes $95 billion of mortgage exposures
by Household Finance, the U.S. subprime subsidiary of HSBC. Moreover, calculation as-
sumes that U.S. hedge funds account for four-fifths of all hedge fund exposures to subprime
mortgages.
13Source: Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown David Green-
law, Jan Hatzius, Anil K Kashyap, Hyun Song Shin (2008) - Goldman Sachs. Authors’
calculations.
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Total subprime exposure Percent of exposure
US Investment Banks 75 5%
US Commercial Banks 250 18%
US GSEs 112 8%
US Hedge Funds 233 17%
Foreign Banks 167 12%
Foreign Hedge Funds 58 4%
Insurance Companies 319 23%
Finance Companies 95 7%
Mutual and Pension
Funds
57 4%
US Leveraged Sector 671 49%
Other 697 51%
Total 1368 100%
Table 5: Subprime Mortgage Exposures
total US consumer credit outstanding amount (sum of revolving and non-
revolving credit) as debt that someone incurs for the purpose of purchasing
a good or a service, usually including all purchases made on credit cards,
lines of credits and loans. Then, in order to capture the increase in the
cost of credit, the third proxy used is the spread between the three-month
US Libor and the three-month Overnight Index Swap (OIS). Unfortunately,
due to the absence of historical data on credit availability outside the United
States, we are forced to adopt for our analysis data that represent only the
US economy. This is a clear limit where global indicators would have been
preferable. The first series provided by the US Federal Reserve is meant
to represent changes in global credit availability. An increase in the series
denotes a tightening of credit conditions, immediately, by looking at figure
3, we recognize that the series during this crisis has reached the highest level
since 1990.
As seen in figure 3 and figure 4, the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Surveys
for January 2010 showed a progressive tightening of standards prime mort-
gages, and commercial and industrial loans from 3rd quarter of 2007 to 4th
quarter of 2008. Since changes in credit availability are expected to influence
growth on real economic activity over the short run, an empirical analysis is
13
Figure 3: US Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Tightening Stan-
dards for C&I Loans. Source: US Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer
Opinion Survey.
Figure 4: US Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Tightening Stan-
dards for Mortgage Prime Loans. Source: US Federal Reserve Senior Loan
Officer Opinion Survey.
needed. In what follows we will show empirical results aimed to capture the
interrelationship between changes in credit availability and real economic
activity. Table 6 reports the results of the Granger Causality tests between
the changes in US credit conditions and the US GDP growth. We find strong
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Figure 5: VAR estimation of the impact of a US credit conditions (net per-
centage of domestic respondents tightening standards for C&I loans) shock
on US GDP growth rate. Notes: Dashed lines are 1 standard-error bands
around the response to a US credit conditions shock (data sample: 1990:2Q-
2009:3Q) .
evidence that changes in US credit conditions Granger Cause real economic
activity and we can reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality also
at 1% significance level. According to VAR estimation method, result of
generalized impulse response function are reported in figure 5. The US
GDP growth rate reacts negatively to innovation in the changes in credit
conditions and such negative impact is statistically significance up to eight
quarters after the shock.
Lags: 1
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat. P-value
Changes in credit conditions does not
Granger Cause GDP growth
77.00 26.91 0.00
GDP growth does not Granger Cause
changes in credit condition
77.00 0.00 0.99
Table 6: Granger Causality Test, 1990:2Q-2009:3Q (USA)
To confirm a stressed credit conditions scenario it could be useful to look
at the behavior of the other two proxies. We may easily recognize an envi-
ronment characterized by big drop in the US consumer credit outstanding
15
Figure 6: Total US Consumer Credit. Source: US Federal Reserve.
Figure 7: Total US Consumer Credit Volatility
amount which decreased at an annual rate of 8.5% in November. Revolv-
ing credit decreased at an annual rate of 18.5%, and non-revolving credit
decreased at an annual rate of 3%. An empirical research (Ivashina and
Scharfstein, 2009) shows that the decline in new loans accelaretad during
the banking panic. It is showed that in the fourth quarter of 2008, the dol-
lar volume of lending was 47% lower than it was in the prior quarter and
the number of issues was 33% lower than it was in the prior quarter. The
drop in October, 2008 was particularly steep. The dollar volume of lending
during the peak crisis period was less than one fourth of its level 18 months
16
period
entire sample (Jan:1943-Nov:2009) 0.9313
pre crisis sample (Jan:1943-Dec:2006) 0.9357
crisis sample (Jan:2007-Nov:2009) -0.1512
Source: US Federal Reserve.
Table 7: Consumer Credit & Industrial Production Correlation
earlier.14 Basically the consumer power of the US, which found its key driver
in the thousand lines of credit allowed to customers, collapsed forcing the
US personal consumption expenditure to a 8% decrease on annul basis in
the last quarter of 2008.
Figure 6 and figure 7 on consumer credit emphasize the out of the ordinary
behavior of the consumer credit within this economic and financial crisis
respect to the past. Consumer credit shows a dozen of consecutive monthly
negative change between 2008 and 2009 (see rightside of figure 6). Thus,
something happened in this economic and financial crisis that has never
happened before in fifty years of consumer credit historical data. Let now
play with basic statistics and let have a look on table 7. Assuming to pick
up monthly data from January:2007 and November:2009 we find that the
correlation between consumer credit and industrial production, which is in
normal condition positive, became negative.
In this scenario people were more anxious and worried than for a very
long time. There was a considerable degree of uncertainty around business,
and this hit further the real economy. The uncertainty and the fear on the
global markets even after the huge amount of liquidity injected by central
banks held, probably due to the fact that many banks were still in trouble
and they decided to keep the liquidity rather than distribute its to the retail
market by allowing loans, mortgages and other forms of consumer credit,
remained quite high for several months.
Figure 8 partially provides a clear proof to this extraordinary scenario.
Notice that, on cumulative monthly basis, using as reference date the Lehman
Brothers Chapter 11 event, the amount of credit fall by 4.33% (with a con-
secutive twelve months negative change) against a 8.68% increase in the
money stock. This contrasts with an original condition in which to a money
stock increase correspond an increase in the availability of credit. To con-
firm the presence of a credit crunch it is sufficient to look and the correlation
14See Ivashina, Victoria and Scharfstein, David S. Bank Lending During the Financial
Crisis of 2008. U.S. Monetary Policy Forum Report No. 2 (July, 2009).
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period
entire sample (Jan:1959-Nov:2009) 0.9895
pre crisis sample (Jan:1959-Dec:2006) 0.9866
crisis sample (Jan:2007-Nov:2009) 0.4603
crisis sample (Aug:2008-Nov:2009) -0.8445
Source: US Federal Reserve.
Table 8: Consumer Credit & M2 Money Stock Correlation
between total consumer credit and M2 (money stock measure) for different
reference periods. In the last fourteen months the correlation became neg-
ative (see table 8). Roughly speaking, while money stock increased, due to
quantitative easing policies, total consumer credit drammatically fell.
Figure 8: Consumer Credit & Money Stock during the crisis (cumulative
growth rate). Source: US Federal Reserve.
Now, a question may arise: Did the liquidity use in the right way? We
will try to answer in section 5. Let’s continue to our data analysis. Figure
9 well represents another symptom of the credit crunch where it is showed
that to an increase in M2 correspond a fall equal to 3% on one month in
the Institutional Money Funds15. As Congressman Ron Paul claimed that
15The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve discontinued publishing data on M3
(which incorporates all data on M1 + M2 =M3) on March 23, 2006. M3 also included bal-
ances in institutional money funds, repurchase liabilities issued by depository institutions
and Eurodollars held by US residents at foreign branches of US banks.
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“M3 is the best description of how quickly the Fed is creating new money
and credit”. In other words, M3 tracks what wealthy people are doing with
their bucks. In contrast to M1 and M2 that increased during the crisis the
aptitude of the Fed to create new money through M3 fell. Basically a real
increasing money scenario was not going on stage.
Figure 9: M2 and Institutional Money Funds (M3) during the crisis. Source:
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
To further proof what we have just analyzed, this “unsuccessful” use
of the quantitative easing policies can be well represented by a negative
correlation between the M2 money stock and the industrial production (see
table 9). To sum up figure 10 illustrates the historical path of monetary base
and consumer credit of the last three years. Dashed line that represents the
total consumer credit has been subjected to a fantastic performance till
August, 2008 due to years of limitless credit availability (banks owned and
provided liquidity through the securization process). In the aftermath of
Lehman Brothers Chapter 11 (September, 2008) credit conditions began
to tighten and Central Banks acted by implementing quantitative easing
policies through cutting rates.
As we know the crisis became severe on August 9/10, 2007 when the
money market interest rose dramatically. This can be easily represented by
our third proxy, which is the spread between three month US Libor and the
three month Overnight Index Swap (OIS).16 We think that in assessing the
role of credit conditions a brief analysis on this measure is required. To be
16Bloomberg tickets: US0003M Index for the US Libor and USSOC CMPN Curncy for
the Overnight Index Swap (OIS).
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Figure 10: M1 Money Stock measure and Credit Consumer.
Period
entire sample (Jan:1959-Nov:2009) 0.9553
pre crisis sample (Jan:1959-Dec:2006) 0.9710
crisis sample (Jan:2007-Nov:2009) -0.9201
Source: US Federal Reserve.
Table 9: Industrial Production & M2 Money Stock Correlation
more precise, the LIBOR-OIS spread is the difference between the LIBOR
and the Overnight Index Swap rate, and is commensurate with the amount of
perceived credit risk in the interbank lending market. Ordinarily, when the
central banks lower their rates of interest, both the LIBOR and the OIS rates
decline with it. However, when banks are unsure of the creditworthiness
of other banks, they charge higher interest rates to compensate them for
the greater risk. Being a measure of financial stress, the spread affects
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the economy because
trillions of dollars of loans and securities are indexed to Libor. An increase
in the spread substantially will increase the cost of such loans and have a
contractionary effect on the economy. Thus, a high spread leads to a limited
availability of credit. Also this measure confirms the presence of a shock in
the US credit market within this economic and financial crisis. If you look
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at lower left of figure 11 and you extended that further to the left, you see a
quite stable spread. But on August 9th and 10th of 2007 this spread jumped
to unusually high levels (480 bps).
Figure 11: Three month US LIBOR three month Overnight Index Swap
(OIS). Source: Bloomberg.
Figure 11 shows also how dramatically the economic and financial crisis
worsened in October 2008. According to the intervention that took place
(Troubled Asset Relief Program, TARP) in the US, in October 10th the
spread reached an extraordinary level of 3644 bps indicating a further tight-
ening credit market conditions. This implied a collapse in the interbank
channel, which is used by banks with excess funds to lend to banks need-
ing funds. When this interbank lending market declines because of higher
interest rates, then banks are forced to hold more cash to conduct business;
hence, they lend less, not only to other banks, but also to consumers. Less
lending means there is less money in the economy, which lowers demands for
products and services.17. This is what really happened in the US credit mar-
ket within the recent crisis. Again figure 11 illustrates how this abnormal
LIBOR-OIS spread hold for more than a year producing a stable and perpet-
ual worsening in credit conditions. Basically the drop in the supply of credit
puts upward pressure on interest rate spreads, and leads to a greater fall in
lending than one might see in a typical recession. Our analysis depicts a
17Note that US Personal Consumption fell by more than 8% on annual basis in the last
quarters of 2008.
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scenario in which tightening credit conditions after the subprime shock, not
only acted as an amplifier, but even better played a fundamental role forcing
consumption, production and investment. Each of the proxy utilized worked
in the same direction showing extraordinary movements. Movements that
have never been happened, even if we compare them to other crisis periods,
which make this economic and financial crisis matchless.
3 Subprime Losses, Credit Crunch, Global De-
mand and World Trade
Having established the central role of mortgage-related debt in the crisis and
the size of credit losses, in this section, we will try to understand how such a
relatively limited and localized event (the subprime loan crisis in the United
States) has to produce effects of such magnitude on the world economy.
More precisely how an initial subprime estimated losses of about $250 billion
dollars ended up in a world GDP loss from 2008 to 2009 approximately equal
to $3.7 trillion dollars, so about 15 times the initial subprime loss.
Figure 12: Trade as share of GPD. Source: OECD-OECDs Members Trade
in Goods and Services as a Percentage of GDP.
The initial subprime losses through its negative impact on the credit
conditions produced a sort of tightening monetary policy. It is well know
from the basic macro theory that such policy produce in the short run a
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decline in the output level. Moreover the scenario was quickly absorbed
by extra US countries. A scenario quickly generated by the fall down in
the US demand of foreign goods and services. A first stop in the global
trade began, affecting not only advanced economies but also poorest coun-
tries export revenues. Conditional on a world scenario where the global
trade in the last years accounted for 40% of the world demand (see figure
12), such demand-investment drop caused an immediate world trade col-
lapse. According to the existence of a strong relationship between the credit
Figure 13: VAR estimation of the impact of a US credit conditions (net per-
centage of domestic respondents tightening standards for C&I loans) shock
on World Trade growth rate. Notes: Dashed lines are 1 standard-error
bands around the response to a US credit conditions shock (data sample:
1990:2Q-2009:3Q). Source: OECD.
conditions and the real market, where to a stop in the lending market cor-
responds an income slowdown, thus a drop in production and consumption,
we recognize a further damage to international trade. To better capture
the effects of a tightening credit conditions on the real economic activity we
have developed a brief analysis between US credit conditions, represented
by the net percentage of domestic respondents tightening standards for C&I
loans time series, and the world trade.18 As figure 13 suggests a positive
18OECD database: World export (import) goods and services volumes are constructed
as weighted averages of the growth rates of the volume of exports (imports) of individual
countries, with the country weights based on shares of global goods and services export
(import) values in 2000, expressed in US dollars. The measure of world trade is calculated
as an arithmetic average of the volume of world imports and exports.
23
change in the net percentage of domestic respondents tightening standards
for C&I loans, thus a negative scenario in the credit availability, produced
a negative impact on the world trade up to several quarters after the shock
and the impact is statistically significance up to the 11th quarters. Even in
this additional analysis we can confirm that the credit component has been
a major cause of the extension and worsening of the crisis. Not so far away
the idea of being able to associate the so-called credit crunch to a restrictive
monetary policy.
Figure 14: VAR estimation (via Montecarlo Simulations) of the impact of a
Global Income shock on World Trade. Notes: Dashed lines are 1 standard-
error bands around the response to a Global Income shock (data sample:
1970:3Q-2009:3Q). Source: OECD.
Figure 14 and figure 15 illustrate the impulse response functions of the
world trade after an income shock. We performed two different estimations
based on different samples and in both cases we can conclude that a positive
shock on global income produces a statistically significance positive impact
on world trade up to three quarters after the shock. On the other hand,
as happened during this economic and financial crisis (partially caused of
the credit crunch), in case of negative shock on the global income we will
get a negative impact on the global trade. The strong relationship between
income and trade is also confirmed by the Granger Causality test in table
10, the null hypothesis that global income growth does not Granger Cause
the world trade growth is rejected at 1% confidence level.
What is clear from our analysis is that a sort of “chain effect” addressed
24
Figure 15: VAR estimation of the impact of a Global Income shock on World
Trade. Notes: Dashed lines are 1 standard-error bands around the response
to a Global Income shock (data sample: 1995:2Q-2009:3Q). Source: OECD.
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat. P-value
Granger Causality Test, 1990:2Q-2009:3Q - Lags:1
Changes in credit conditions does not
Granger Cause World Trade growth
77 12.3057 0.0008
World Trade growth does not Granger
Cause changes in credit conditions
77 3.5255 0.0644
Granger Causality Test, 1996:2Q-2009:3Q - Lags:1
Global Income growth does not Granger
Cause World Trade growth
53 17.5217 0.0001
World Trade growth does not Granger
Cause Global Income growth
53 2.9056 0.0945
Table 10: Granger Causality Test, Credit Conditions, Income and Trade
Estimation Results
to the deterioration of the global markets condition began to take shape. It
started first with the panic in financial markets, followed by the discovery
of a huge amount of toxic assets. As a consequence the credit crunch born
and the global demand began to freeze. Our analysis demostrates that the
US tightening credit conditions have represented the starting point of this
crisis but it also shows how a local phenomenon has been able to affect the
world economy as a whole. To further proof this sort of “collapse chain”
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it is sufficient to look at the behavior of the US savings. The US savings,
in contrast to all the other US macro variables, increased during the last
quarters, partially due to uncertainty and fear in the global markets.19 Note
that the US private saving rate , which on average represented the 2.6% of
the US personal income during the last ten years, after the Lehman collapse
to the end of 2009 jumped, tracking an average of 4.4%.20
Figure 16: Global Gross Domestic Product growth rate (on quarterly basis).
OECD, Global Gross Domestic Product - expenditure approach .
Considering also the fact that US private consumption accounted for
about 16 percent of global output it is not surprising that the economizing
by US consumers has pushed the world economy into a deep recession. We
also show a series of figures to capture the amplitude of the economic and
financial crisis effects on the global demand and trade. From figure 16 we
can easily capture the entity of the demand collapse. It shows a negative
change on the Global GDP of about 8% on annual basis in the last quarter
19On this point it is important to stress the fact that many people, even during the
crisis, got their original wages, especially in those countries where the percentage of labor
income to GDP is very high. In any case, panic, fear and uncertainty stimulated savings
rather than demand, which would also be more convenient. On the other hand price of
many consumer consumer goods fell.
20Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Data have been obtained as follows:
• average of monthly personal saving rates between January, 2000 and September
2008, as the pre-crisis sample;
• average of monthly personal saving rates between October, 2008 and December
2009, as the crisis sample.
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Figure 17: World Gross Domestic Product & World Trade (growth rates
on annual basis). Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic
Outlook Database, October 2009.
Figure 18: G7 Gross Domestic Product & World Trade (growth rates on
quarterly basis). Source: OECD
of 2008. Next, from figure 17, which compares the World GDP growth rate
and World Trade growth rate (on annual basis), and from figure 18, which
compares the G7 GDP growth rate and the World Trade growth rate (on
quarterly basis); we can conclude that global trade suffered much more than
the global demand and that its impact on real economic activity can not be
underestimated.
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As a conclusion we can state that a mix of tightening conditions within
the credit market plus the global trade collapse, as showed in this section,
figure out as the most global economic and financial crisis since the great
depression of the 30’s.
4 Uncertainty Shocks Effects
As the empirical analysis of the previous sections pointed out, shocks in
financial markets, credit market tightening conditions and world trade col-
lapse have been crucial for the origin, growth and development of the recent
economic and financial crisis. It should be quite evident that each of the
above mentioned factor has showed extraordinary movements. In our opin-
ion these effects are justified by the fact that the behavior of the world
wide players within the financial markets, credit markets and real markets
did not properly match the theoretical framework or a class of standard
behaviors. As a matter of fact such scenario may find an explanation in
the presence of panic and uncertainty in the markets. We can recognize
this atmosphere, characterized by panic and uncertainty, in a series of figure
here below illustrated. As observed by Nicholas Bloom in The Impact of
Figure 19: Monthly US stock market volatility (S&P 500). Source:
Bloomberg.
Uncertainty Shocks, uncertainty appears to dramatically increase after ma-
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jor economic and political shocks.21 Figure 19 plots stock market volatility,
used as proxy for uncertainty, which displays large bursts of uncertainty af-
ter major shocks. In fact one of the most salient effects of the credit crunch
has been a huge surge in stock market volatility. The uncertainty on the
financial markets and the unpredictability of the policy response of central
banks and governments have all led to remarkable instability. Such an ex-
traordinary event can be easily captured by looking at figure 19 where S&P
500 volatility - commonly known as the index of “financial fear”- has more
than double since the subprime crisis first emerged in August 2007, reaching
its highest level at the end of 2008 (60%). As noticed by Nicholas Bloom this
big jump in uncertainty is of similar magnitude to those that followed sig-
nificant economic and political shocks, such as the Cuban missile crisis, the
Franklin National Financial crisis, the Black Monday, the Gulf War and the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. But after these earlier shocks, volatility spiked and
then quickly fell back. In fact, during past economic and political shocks,
volatility dropped back to baseline levels within at most three/four months.
On the contrary, the volatility level after the Lehman Brothers Chapter 11
event, have remained persistently high for nine months. It also reached the
highest pick since the 1960s. Our analysis will be traced on the empirical
work of Nicholas Bloom and also will be extended to the credit crunch and
monetary shocks impacts on the real economic activity.
Figure 20: Consumer Credit annualized growth rate. Source: US Federal
Reserve.
21See Bloom, N. (2009): “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks”, Econometrica, Vol. 77,
No. 3 (May, 2009), 623-685.
29
Figure 21: M2 Money Stock annualized growth rate. Source: US Federal
Reserve.
Figure 22: VAR estimation of the impact of a S&P 500 Implied Volatility
shock on US Industrial Production growth rate. Notes: Dashed lines are 1
standard-error bands around the response to a S&P 500 Implied Volatility
shock.
To evaluate the impact of uncertainty shocks on real economic outcomes
we estimate a range of VARs based on monthly data. The variables sub-
jected to our empirical analysis are S&P 500 implied volatility, a stock mar-
ket volatility indicator, industrial production, consumer credit and M2 as
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Figure 23: VAR estimation of the impact of a S&P 500 Volatility Index (0 or
1) shock on US Industrial Production growth rate. Notes: Dashed lines are
1 standard-error bands around the response to a S&P 500 Volatility Index
shock.
Figure 24: VAR estimation of the impact of an US Consumer Credit shock on
US Industrial Production growth rate. Notes: Dashed lines are 1 standard-
error bands around the response to a Consumer Credit shock.
money stock measure. Stock market volatility indicator, consumer credit
volatility index and M2 money stock volatility index are defined as a 0 or 1
binary series where we associated one to changes above the 95th percentile
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Figure 25: VAR estimation of the impact of an US Consumer Credit Index
(0 or 1) shock on US Industrial Production growth rate. Notes: Dashed
lines are 1 standard-error bands around the response to an US Consumer
Credit Index shock.
Figure 26: VAR estimation of the impact of a S&P 500 Implied Volatil-
ity shock on US Unemployment growth rate. Notes: Dashed lines are 1
standard-error bands around the response to a S&P 500 Implied Volatility
shock.
of the squared deviations from the mean distribution of the time series and
zero otherwise. If we plot such special 0 or 1 series we identify that in most
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Figure 27: VAR estimation of the impact of a S&P 500 Volatility Index (0
or 1) shock on US Unemployment growth rate. Notes: Dashed lines are
1 standard-error bands around the response to a S&P 500 Volatility Index
shock.
cases to each political shock corresponds a 1, which in turn refers to each
pick in figure 20 and 21. Note also that the shocks in the M2 money stock
market and in the consumer credit market are consistent with phases of the
financial markets subject to high volatility. Not least the fact that to each
volatility peak (see figure 19) corresponds a one in the other markets.
We already know, due to VAR estimations theory, that an impulse response
function traces the effect of a one standard deviation shock to one of the inno-
vations on current and future values of the endogenous variables. Vector au-
toregression (VAR) estimations suggest that stock market volatility shocks
have a large real impact, generating a substantial drop in real economic ac-
tivity and an increase in unemployment over the following six months (see
figure 26). Note also that in the long run the shocks will be completely
absorbed. Using the same methodology for the impact of credit crunch on
real economic activity, our VAR estimation, as illustrated in figure 25, sug-
gest that a credit market volatility shocks have a negative impact on real
economic activity.22 Estimations results confirm again how a mix of ex-
traordinary events, such as financial markets uncertainty and credit crunch,
produced a global chaos of such magnitude.
22In this case dashed lines contain the zero level, this imply that the estimation is not
statistically significance
33
5 Were the Central Banks right?
We recognized that this demand global collapse has been a consequence
of several causes such as the sub-prime mortgages, the credit crunch, the
trade collapse, which mixed together affected the real economic activity in
a strong and permanent manner.23 In what follows we will focus on the
policies implemented by central banks to avoid a deep recession. As one
of the most popular macroeconomics book for undergraduate studies can
suggest us, in presence of such a drop in the demand, thus a declines in the
Gross Domestic Product, the standard approach, or more precisely, the clas-
sic strategy to implement is to increase the stock of money in the market, by
an open market operation where the central banks buy bonds in the bonds
market. As we know the conduct of monetary policy has a direct effect on
the performance of the economy because it has a major impact on money
supply and interest rates. For the reason that the crisis started in the US
and considering also the fact that they first implemented an expansionary
monetary policy, our analysis will be mainly based on this country. US mon-
etary policy affects all kinds of economic and financial decisions people make
in this country-whether to get a loan to buy a new house or car or to start
up a company, whether to expand a business by investing in a new plant or
equipment, and whether to put savings in a bank, in bonds, or in the stock
market, for example. Furthermore, because the U.S. is the largest economy
in the world, its monetary policy also has significant economic and financial
effects on other countries. It works by affecting demand across the economy-
that is, people’s and firms’ willingness to spend on goods and services. In
any case, the relationship between money supply and economic conditions
is a vast subject that cannot be explained in this paper. In fact, our main
purpose is not the one of explaining the effects of a quantitative easing pol-
icy, but the one of investigating on what went wrong in implementing these
policies, more precisely if the monetary policies implemented within this
economic and financial crisis were accurate. There is a general consensus
that government actions and interventions caused, prolonged, and worsened
the economic and financial crisis. As already mentioned in this paper they
caused it by setting interest rates in an inadequate manner, especially com-
paring them with historical values. They prolonged it by misdiagnosing the
problems in the bank credit markets and thereby responding incorrectly by
focusing on liquidity rather than risk. They made it worse by providing
23On this issue, after the Lehman Brothers Chapter 11 event, remember that US GDP
displayed three consecutive quarter of negative growth’s rate and that US Production
Index decreased for eight consecutive months.
34
support for certain financial institution and their creditors but not others
without a clear and understandable agenda. Even if important and funda-
mental from an empirical point of view a plain data analysis is not sufficient
for a total understanding of the economic and financial crisis. As verified in
previous sections financial markets, credit crunch and world trade collapse
showed extraordinary behaviors in this recent crisis. According to those be-
haviors global markets’ uncertainty rose dramatically. Furthermore, vague-
ness about the procedures or criteria for government interventions made the
global market weaker and even more subject to uncertainty. Thus, we also
need to understand how government actions and interventions could be im-
plemented and if those implemented were right or not. Emphasizing the
problems in the credit markets and their support in prolonging the crisis,
based on a theoretical framework we will try to discuss about an appropriate
monetary policy function aimed to incorporate a macro scenario character-
ized by credit market shocks and “systemic risk”. Economic models are
useful tools for helping to deal with these uncertainties partially reducing
the complexity of the policy decision-making process, thus helping monetary
authorities to achieve their goals. However, considering the fact that models
are only an approximation of to the real economy, there will always be un-
certainty about the correct structure of an economic model. As suggested by
Blinder (1995) the presence of uncertainty can have important implications
for policy. Uncertainty is in fact a serious consideration in the formulation
of policy decisions, as summarized in the following quote by Alan Blinder
while speaking on the strategy of monetary policy:
”Unfortunately, actually to use such a strategy in practice, you
have to use forecast, knowing that they may be wrong.
You have to base you thinking on some kind of monetary theory,
even though that they might be wrong.
And you have to attach numbers to that theory, knowing that
your numbers might be wrong.
We at the Fed have all these fallible tools, and no choice but to
use them”
In particular, uncertainty makes monetary authorities more conservative
in the sense that they prefer to determine the appropriate policy response ig-
noring uncertainty, thus, “doing less”. This conservative approach was first
formulated, in a theoretical economic model, by William Brainard (1967).24
24Brainard, W. (1967), ”Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy”, American Eco-
nomic Review, 57(2), pp. 411-425.
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Brainard developed a model of policy implementation in which the policy-
maker is uncertain about the impact of the policy instrument on the econ-
omy. With a single policy instrument Brainard showed that optimal policy
is a function of both the first and second central moments characterizing the
model parameters.25 Basically this type of uncertainty limits movements of
the policy instrument away from the level at which policymakers are most
certain about its effect. Based on Brainard’s intuition our model will ac-
count for different sources of uncertainty and also for another policy-maker,
next we will try to understand if conservative is always the appropriate re-
sponse. In our first theoretical model reinterpretation we develop a two
countries model in which uncertainty does not exist and both are interested
in maximizing the respectively policy functions. Suppose that the policy
maker of the domestic country and the policy-maker of the foreign country
are concerned respectively with the following target variables (y) and (y* ).
Assume that (y) and (y* ) depend linearly on P and P* policy instruments
(obviously in this second case domestic for the first country but foreign for
the second one). Four our purposes the impact of the exogenous variables
may be summarized in a single variable, u for (y) and z for (y* ). Formally:
y = αP + βP ∗ + u (1)
y∗ = α∗P ∗ + β∗P + z (2)
where the target variable (y) depends also on the foreign policy instru-
ment P* and vice versa the foreign target variable (y* ) depends also on
the foreign policy instrument P. Excluding uncertainty about parameters
and assuming the policy-makers choose policy on the basis of a quadratic
expected utility,26 the maximization problem become as follows:
minP L = E(y − y¯)2 (3)
for the domestic policy-maker, and:
minP ∗ L = E(y
∗ − y¯∗)2 (4)
for the foreign policy maker.
25Only the first and second moment are required because of the assumption that the
policy-maker has quadratic preferences.
26Note that from a mathematical point of view, a quadratic form is homogeneous poly-
nomial of degree two in a number of variables.
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In both problems the policy-makers minimizes the squared deviations of
output around the target level, denoted by y¯ and y¯∗. And substituting for
(y) and (y* ) we obtain:
minP L = E(αP + βP
∗ + u− y¯)2 (5)
minP ∗ L = E(α
∗P ∗ + β∗P + z − y¯∗)2 (6)
thus, the associated optimal policies:
∂L
∂P = 0 ⇒ 2(αP + βP ∗ + u− y¯)α = 0
⇒ Poptimal = y¯ − βP
∗ − u
α
(7)
∂L∗
∂P ∗ = 0 ⇒ 2(α∗P ∗ + β∗P + z − y¯∗)α∗ = 0
⇒ P ∗optimal =
y¯∗ − β∗P − z
α∗
(8)
where the home country chooses the best (P ) given (P ∗) and the foreign
country chooses the best (P ∗) given (P ). Substituting for (P ∗) and (P ) we
obtain the following optimal solutions/quantities for our policy-makers:27
Poptimal =
α∗(y¯ − u)− β(y¯∗ − z)
αα∗ − ββ∗ (9)
P ∗optimal =
α(y¯∗ − z)− β∗(y¯ − u)
αα∗ − ββ∗ (10)
In this simple two countries model we can easily recognize that, in case
of negative response coefficients β and β∗, Poptimal and P ∗optimal should be
implemented in a more aggressive way. On the other side of the coin, as-
suming the existence of a global and unique liquidity market, in case of
positive response coefficients, policy responses could be implemented in a
weaker manner.
We next represent the same model including in our structural equations (y)
and (y* ) the effect of the credit crunch, both for the home and foreign coun-
tries. In our analysis the credit crunch, is intended to represent a sort of
tightening monetary policy playing against the monetary expansion imple-
mented by the central banks within the economic and financial crisis. The
credit crunch effects are represented by P2 and P
∗
2 . Formally:
27The solution is derived in more detail in Appendix 7.3.
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y = α1P1 + α2P2 + β1P
∗
1 + β2P
∗
2 + u (11)
y = α∗1P
∗
1 + α
∗
2P
∗
2 + β
∗
1P1 + β
∗
2P2 + z (12)
where P2 and P
∗
2 denote the credit crunch respectively for the domestic
country and the foreign country. Maximizing the same quadratic utility
function and solving for P1 and P
∗
1 we obtain the following optimal policy
responses:
P1 optimal =
y¯ − α2P2 − β1P ∗1 − β2P ∗2 − u
α1
(13)
P ∗1 optimal =
y¯∗ − α∗2P ∗2 − β∗1P1 − β∗2P2 − z
α∗1
(14)
If response coefficients of (y) and (y* ) to credit crunch P2 and P
∗
2 are
negative domestic and foreign policy makers further need to be more aggres-
sive in implementing their quantitative easing monetary policies. Basically
this scenario represents what really happened in our global liquidity market
within the economic and financial crisis. Therefore (see section 3), the credit
crunch acted as a tightening monetary policy, having also a negative impact
on the policy-makers targets.28 To sum up, in such a global liquidity market
scenario, not only the home credit crunch impact caused tightening credit
conditions, but also the one of the foreign country.
In what follows we will introduce uncertainty component in the model. As
we know there are many sources of uncertainty faced by policy-makers, a
number of which stem from the fact that the structure of the economy is
changing over time. In this section we consider the case where at any point
in time the policy-maker is uncertain about the value of the model parame-
ters. Therefore uncertain about the effect of policy changes which has been
termed multiplier uncertainty. We assume that the structural relationships
of the model are known and expressed including the credit crunch compo-
nents and the impact of the foreign country policies (see equations 11 and
12):
y = α1P1 + α2P2 + β1P
∗
1 + β2P
∗
2 + u (15)
y = α∗1P
∗
1 + α
∗
2P
∗
2 + β
∗
1P1 + β
∗
2P2 + z (16)
where the sources of uncertainty are represented by [α1, α2,β1, β2, α
∗
1,
α∗2, β∗1 , β∗2 , u and z ], more precisly by the response coefficients of targets
(y) and (y* ) to policy actions. As listed above, policy-makers face several
28Note that this is also valid for lagged values of P2 and P
∗
2 .
38
kinds of uncertainty. Four our purposes we recognize uncertainty as the
policy-maker uncertainty about the impact of the exogenous variables (u
and z ) and uncertainty as the policy-maker uncertainty about the response
of y to any given policy action [α1, α2,β1, β2, α
∗
1, α
∗
2, β
∗
1 , β
∗
2 ]. Therefore
coefficients uncertainty is introduced by assuming that the policy-makers
view the multiplier as a random variable. Thanks to the variance scaling
property and the Bienoym formula we can define the total variance for our
two structural equations (y) and (y*) in the following way:29
σ2y = σ
2
α 1P
2
1 + σ
2
α 2P
2
2 + σ
2
β 1P
∗2
1 + σ
2
β 2P
∗2
2
+σ2u + 2ρσα 1σα 2P1P2 + 2ρσα 1σβ 1P1P
∗
1
+2ρσα 1σβ 2P1P
∗
2 + 2ρσα 2σβ 1P2P
∗
1
+2ρσα 2σβ 2P2P
∗
2 + 2ρσβ 1σβ 2P
∗
1P
∗
2
σ∗2y = σ
∗2
α 1P
∗2
1 + σ
∗2
α 2P
∗2
2 + σ
∗2
β 1P
2
1 + σ
∗2
β 2P2
+σ2z + 2ρσ
∗
α 1σ
∗
α 2P
∗
1P
∗
2 + 2ρσ
∗
α 1σ
∗
β 1P
∗
1P1
+2ρσ∗α 1σ
∗
β 2P
∗
1P2 + 2ρσ
∗
α 2σ
∗
β 1P
∗
2P1
+2ρσ∗α 2σ
∗
β 2P
∗
2P2 + 2ρσ
∗
β 1σ
∗
β 2P1P2
where we have also assumed that there are no correlations between the
exogenous terms u and z and the respectively response coefficients. Being
a weighted sum of variables, the variable with the largest weight will have
a disproportionally largest weight in the variance of the total. Note that
this state cannot be underestimated and may play a crucial role in the
development of an optimal monetary policy.
The goal of the policy-makers is still presumed to be to minimize the squared
deviations of output around the target level, denoted by y¯. The expected
loss functions are given by:
minP L = E[(y − y¯)2)] (17)
29The original form of this property states as follows: V ar(αx + βY ) = α2V ar(x) +
β2V ar(y) + 2αβcov(x; y) where x and y are random varibles and α and β are weights.
Instead of using the covariance we have adopted the correlation by applying the rela-
tionship property between the covariance and the correlation. Formally:ρα+βx; c+dy =
cov(α+βx; c+dy)√
V ar(α+βx)·V ar(c+dy =
cov(α+βx; c+dy)√
β2V ar(x)·d2V ar(y
= αβ·cov(x; y)√
β2V ar(x)·d2V ar(y)
= αβ·cov(x; y)
αβ·
√
V ar(x)·V ar(y) ⇒
βd · ρx; y ·
√
V ar(x) · V ar(y) = βd · cov(x; y).
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minP ∗ L = E[(y
∗ − y¯∗)2] (18)
However this is to equivalent to minimizing the variance of y ≡ σ2y
around its mean value. In our previous analysis minimizing the loss func-
tion and minimizing the variance of y were equivalent because the model
was characterized by certainty equivalence. This, in turn, implied that we
set E(y) = y˜ = y¯. Basically we stated that the variance of y around y˜ was
equal to the variance around y¯. In other words, the expected value of y
was equal to its target level. Adding multiplicative uncertainty the choice of
optimal values of the instruments should take into account the relationship
between instruments values and the variance of the goal variable.
The relevant loss functions can be rewritten as
minP L = E[(y − y˜ + y˜ − y¯)2)] = E[σ2y + (y˜ − y¯)2)] (19)
minP ∗ L = E[(y
∗ − y¯∗)2] = E[σ∗2y + (y˜∗ − y¯∗)2)] (20)
where in the second expression the cross product terms from the multi-
plication drop out because E(y − y˜) = 0. Substituting for σ2y and σ∗2y and
for the estimated value of y and y∗ (y˜ and y˜∗); and by differentiating with
respect to P1 and P
∗
1 , and setting the derivatives equal to zero, the optimal
values of P1 and P
∗
1 are easily found to be:
P1 optimal =
α˜1(y¯−α˜2P2−β˜1P ∗1−β˜2P ∗2−u˜)−ρσα1σα2P2−ρσα1σβ1P ∗1−ρσα1σβ2P ∗2
(α˜21+σ
2
α1)
P ∗1 optimal =
α˜∗1(y¯∗−α˜∗1P ∗1−β˜∗1P1−β˜∗2P2−z˜)−ρσ∗α1σ∗α2P ∗2−ρσ∗α1σ∗β1P1−ρσ∗α1σ∗β2P2
(α˜∗21 +σ
∗2
α1)
where α˜1, α˜2, β˜1, β˜2, α˜∗1, α˜∗2, β˜∗1 and β˜∗2 denote the estimated values of
our parameters.
The optimal policies clearly differ from the policies which would be pursued
in a world of certainty or certainty equivalence. These differences can be eas-
ily recognized by comparing results in an uncertainty framework with those
obtained in the certainty equivalent model. Policy-makers should make use
of more information than the expected value of the exogenous variables and
of the response coefficients. Even if we have assumed that the response co-
efficients and the exogenous variables are independently distributed, policy-
makers need further information about the response coefficient variances as
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well as their means. Then, if correlations exist between response coefficients,
policy-makers also need to know their correlations. The economic and fi-
nancial crisis has been characterized by extraordinary events which bring
the global economy to a deep recession. Central banks and governments
needed to produce effective strategies to get out of this recession. In order
to make closer this goal a series of quantitative easing policies were imple-
mented. But were they right? According to Brainard’s intuition and in
the hypothesis of correlations between response coefficients, policy-makers
should be more caution in implementing their policies. From a theoretical
point of view central banks would have to take into account all sources of
uncertainty and therefore act accordingly to this scenario. In such unpre-
dictable environment about the possible ex-post policies reactions a better
strategy could be the one of a moderate cut reference rates policy. Roughly
speaking P1 optimal and P
∗
1 optimal had to be lower. In reality this does not
reflect what really happened during the crisis. In fact from September 2007
to January 2009 the Federal Reserve cut Fed funds rate 5 times (see ta-
ble 10), a quite aggressive program respect to what theory suggests, also
well accepted and followed by other economies. It is well know that behind
this aggressive policies lay the need to preserve the mortgage market and
financial institutions bankruptcy.
Date Increase Decrease Level (%)
December 16, 2008 ... 75 - 100 0 - 0.25
October 29, 2008 ... 50 1
October 8, 2008 ... 50 1.5
April 1, 2008 ... 25 2
March 18, 2008 ... 75 2.25
January 30, 2008 ... 50 3
January 22, 2008 ... 75 3.5
Table 11: Intended federal funds rate, change and level. Source: Federal
Reserve
In our analysis we have tried to capture such extraordinary events pro-
viding an appropriate optimal response. We have added to the standard
framework the impact of the credit crunch, referring also to the one of for-
eign country, and the effects of foreign country’s policy. Including these
components, the theoretical model suggests us that policy-makers’ uncer-
tainty increased, especially due to the credit crunch shocks. Furthermore,
assigning greater weight to the credit crunch component, such component
becomes fundamental in the computation of the total variance. Even if neg-
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ative correlation were verified between the monetary policy response coeffi-
cient and the credit crunch impact coefficient, hence an uncertainty cutback
come out, we recognize that quantitative easing policies implemented, in
order to be optimal, had to be more aggressive. Emphasizing the role of the
credit and assigning it a major weight, still in presence of negative corre-
lation, the optimal solution demonstrates that quantitative easing policies
were not enough to reach an immediate recovery. Suppose to assign a sub-
stantial weight to P2 and P
∗
2 .
30 According to our optimal solutions for P1
and P ∗1 it is not difficult to capture how to a bigger credit crunch weights
should correspond higher optimal solutions. Thus, credit crunch not only
increase uncertainty but also played against the quantitative easing policies
(home P1 and foreign P
∗
1 ). In an extraordinary scenario where to a ex-
pansionary monetary policy correspond tightening credit conditions, in fact
their response coefficient are negative correlated, optimal solutions for P1
and P ∗1 suggest to be more aggressive. Basically a simple ex post analysis
based on this theoretical model suggests us that on one side policy-makers
should have been more cautious (due to a steady increase in the overall vari-
ance) and on the other side (given the negative correlation) they would have
been more aggressive. In our opinion central banks partially underestimated
the effects of such tightening credit conditions as contractionary monetary
policy and furthermore did not recognize that the use o a huge amount of
liquidity to save banks capital ratios produced a stop in the consumer credit
market trough lower lending capacity. As a consequences a drop in the pri-
vate consumption and private investment occurred. As already mentioned,
Brainard argued that, in response to uncertainty about the parameter on a
variable, policymakers should attenuate their policy response to movements
in that variable. Even more, in case of n instruments, thus, uncertainty
about n parameters, policymakers should adopted further caution in im-
plementing their policies. Brainard’s finding, however intuitive, has been
shown not to be general: some forms of parameter uncertainty suggest that
policymakers should discount incoming data, but others suggest that poli-
cymakers should respond more aggressively to incoming data. Our model’s
reorganization partially support Brainard’s finding, even more showed that
with n instrument, a higher uncertainty increases the size of the overall risk.
On the other hand an ex-post analysis demonstrate that some parameters
uncertainty, in our case, those referring to credit crunch, during the crisis
obliged policymakers to be more aggressive.
30Note that our main intuition is that credit crunch has been really important in the
evolution of this economic and financial crisis.
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6 Conclusion
Our analysis outlines and proves that variables, such as money stock, con-
sumer credit rather than global trade, during this crisis behaved in a different
way respect to standards behaviors explained by theory or past empirical
analysis. On one hand this extraordinary environment could be mostly ex-
plained by the presence of uncertainty in the market. On the other hand,
it is also important to stress the fact that an optimal money supply strat-
egy has not been implemented during the crisis, generating further panic
and uncertainty in the global markets. As a matter of fact a plain data
analysis on money stock measures and credit condition measures show how
the huge amount of liquidity injected by central banks within the economic
and financial crisis have been used by investment and commercial banks
to reestablish their own capital ratios rather than to distribute this liquid-
ity in the interbank lending market through loans or mortgages, which are
fundamental pre-requisites for a sustainable economic activity in terms of
consumption, investment and productivity. The above mentioned reasons
played against the quantitative easing policies implemented by Federal Re-
serve and by other central banks. In fact we have seen that central banks
acted, even contrary to what suggested by the theory, in a very aggressive
manner (cutting rates in a sustained way for several months). However, in
our humble opinion, this liquidity did not push in the right channels avoiding
an improvement in the credit market conditions. Basically liquidity stopped
in the interbank sector and did not move from commercial banks to cus-
tomers and firms. Therefore the currency in circulation was not sufficient
to make markets safer and more confident, and also to give breath to busi-
nesses and consumers through bank loans or mortgages or other financing
sources. As noticed by Paul Krugman, economists have to face up to the in-
convenient reality that financial markets fall far short of perfection and that
they are subject to extraordinary delusions. Financial markets have became
fundamental for a global market equilibrium. They produce also fear, diffi-
dence and uncertainty, once cracks occur economists have to do their best
to incorporate the realities of finance into macroeconomics. But during the
last economic and financial crisis, financial markets turmoil, even if relevant,
cannot be use exclusively to justify the global demand collapse. Instead the
reason of such extraordinary and prolonged slump can be found through the
study of the credit market and its tightening conditions. The economic and
financial crisis pointed out several weaknesses in macroeconomic monetary
policies. An ex-post analysis suggests that policymakers should redesigned
policy strategies, so as to implement the main lessons from the crisis, es-
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pecially those concerned with financial markets shocks, exploding leverage
and tightening credit conditions.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Financial Markets and Real economic activity relation-
ship
ADF Test Statistic -2.575016 1% Critical Value* -2.5678
5% Critical Value -1.9397
10% Critical Value -1.6158
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-value
ECM(-1) -0.008683 0.003372 -2.575016 0.0102
D(ECM(-1)) 0.069227 0.03218 2.151279 0.0317
D(ECM(-2)) -0.060058 0.032168 -1.867054 0.0622
D(ECM(-3)) -0.101084 0.032153 -3.143842 0.0017
D(ECM(-4)) 0.035355 0.032259 1.095977 0.2734
D(ECM(-5)) 0.059504 0.032274 1.843744 0.0655
D(ECM(-6)) -0.047816 0.032176 -1.486084 0.1376
D(ECM(-7)) 0.056863 0.032199 1.76596 0.0777
D(ECM(-8)) 0.085155 0.032247 2.640713 0.0084
Table 12: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation, DJIA Stock Index &
and US Industrial Production (1929:08-2009:09)
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7.2 Financial Transmission
Figure 28: Global Stock Markets. Source: Reuters
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α β R-squared
France (CAC 40) 1.0377 1.0361 0.8962
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Germany (DAX) 0.7155 1.1085 0.8702
(0.0010) (0.0000)
Spain (IBEX 35) 0.2353 1.2643 0.8972
(0.2710) (0.0000)
UK (FTSE 100) 4.0947 0.6357 0.8806
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Suisse (SMI) 1.5913 1.0204 0.9342
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Brasil (IBOVESPA) -4.5506 2.0556 0.5536
(0.0000) (0.0000)
China (HANG SENG) 5.4144 0.5906 0.4100
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Japan (NIKKEI 225) 10.9074 -0.1956 0.0541
(0.0011) (0.0000)
*p values are in the brackets
Table 13: Regression Parameters - Independent Variable: Log(S&P Stock
Index). Sample: Jan 1994 - Mar 2010 (195 monthly observations)
7.3 Two Countries Static Model for Domestic and Foreign
Optimal Monetary Policies in a certainty equivalent frame-
work
In this appendix we generalize Brainard’s (1967) solution to the optimal pol-
icy problem in a duopoly scenario for a couple of policy-maker with quadratic
preferences using a two structural equations based on two instruments and
one target. The model can be written in the following general form:
minP L = E(y − y¯)2) for the domestic policy −maker (21)
minP ∗ L = E(y
∗ − y¯∗)2 for the foreign policy −maker (22)
subject to:
y = αP + βP ∗ + u (23)
y∗ = α∗P ∗ + β∗P + z (24)
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which can be rewritten substituting for y and y∗ as:
minP L = E(αP + βP
∗ + u− y¯)2 (25)
minP ∗ L = E(α
∗P ∗ + β∗P + z − y¯∗)2 (26)
The optimal solutions can be easily derived by setting the first partial
derivatives with respect to P and P ∗ equal to zero:
∂L
∂P = 0 ⇒ 2(αP + βP ∗ + u− y¯)α = 0 ⇒
⇒ Poptimal = α(y¯ − βP
∗ − u)
α2
=
y¯ − βP ∗ − u
α
(27)
∂L∗
∂P ∗ = 0 ⇒ 2(α∗P ∗ + β∗P + z − y¯∗)α∗ = 0 ⇒
⇒ P ∗optimal =
α∗(y¯∗ − β∗P − z)
α∗2
=
y¯∗ − β∗P − z
α∗
(28)
where the home country chooses the best P given P* and the foreign
country chooses the best P ∗ given P . Substituting for (P ∗) and (P ) we ob-
tain the following optimal solutions (quantities) for our two policy-makers:
Poptimal =
y¯−β( y¯∗−β∗P−z
α∗ )−u
α =
α∗y¯−βY¯ ∗+ββ∗P−βz−α∗u
α∗
α =
= α
∗(Y¯−u)−β(y¯∗−z)+ββ∗P
αα∗ ⇒ Poptimal(αα∗ − ββ∗) = α∗(Y¯ − u)− β(y¯∗ − z)
Poptimal =
α∗(Y¯ − u)− β(y¯∗ − z)
αα∗ − ββ∗ (29)
P ∗optimal =
y¯∗−β∗( y¯−βP∗−u
α
)−z
α∗ =
αy¯∗−β∗y¯+β∗βP∗+β∗u−αz
α
α∗ =
= α(y¯
∗−z)−β(y¯−u)+β∗βP ∗
α∗α ⇒ P ∗optimal(α∗α− β∗β) = α(y¯∗ − z)− β∗(y¯ − u)
Poptimal =
α(y¯∗ − z)− β∗(y¯ − u)
α∗α− β∗β (30)
Alternative, if we include credit crunch impact both for home country
and foreign country, then the model takes the following form:
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minP L = E(y − y¯)2) for the domestic policy −maker (31)
minP ∗ L = E(y
∗ − y¯∗)2 for the foreign policy −maker (32)
subject to:
y = α1P1 + α2P2 + β1P
∗
1 + β2P
∗
2 + u (33)
y∗ = α∗1P
∗
1 + α
∗
2P
∗
2 + β
∗
1P1 + β
∗
2P2 + z (34)
which can be rewritten substituting for y and y∗ as:
minP L = E(α1P1 + α2P2 + β1P
∗
1 + β2P
∗
2 + u− y¯)2) (35)
minP ∗ L = E(α
∗
1P
∗
1 + α
∗
2P
∗
2 + β
∗
1P1 + β
∗
2P2 + z − y¯∗)2 (36)
Once more optimal solutions can be easily derived by setting the first
partial derivatives with respect to P1 and P
∗
1 equal to zero:
∂L
∂P1
= 0⇒ 2(α1P1 + α2P2 + β1P ∗1 + β2P ∗2 + u− y¯)α1 = 0⇒
⇒ P1 optimal = α1(y¯−α2P2−β1P
∗
1−β2P ∗2−u)
α21
P1 optimal =
(y¯ − α2P2 − β1P ∗1 − β2P ∗2 − u)
α1
(37)
∂L∗
∂P ∗1
= 0⇒ 2(α∗1P ∗1 + α∗2P ∗2 + β∗1P1 + β∗2P2 + z − y¯∗)α∗1 = 0⇒
⇒ P ∗1 optimal = α
∗
1(y¯
∗−α∗2P∗2−β∗1P1−β∗2P2−z)
α∗21
P ∗1 optimal =
(y¯∗ − α∗2P ∗2 − β∗1P1 − β∗2P2 − z)
α∗1
(38)
where the home country chooses the best P1 given P
∗
1 and the foreign
country chooses the best P ∗1 given P1 . Substituting then for ( P ∗1 ) and (
P1) we obtain the following optimal solutions/quantities for our two policy-
makers:
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P1 optimal =
y¯−α2P2−β1( (y¯
∗−α∗2P
∗
2 −β
∗
1P1−β
∗
2P2−z)−β2P
∗
2
α∗
1
)
α1
=
=
(
α∗1(y¯−α2P2−β2P
∗
2 −u)−β1(y¯∗−α
∗
2P
∗
2 −β
∗
2P2−z+β1β
∗
1P1)
α∗
1
)
α1
⇒
=
α∗1(y¯−α2P2−β2P ∗2−u)−β1(y¯∗−α∗2P ∗2−β∗2P2−z+β1β∗1P1)
α∗1
· 1α1 ⇒
and solving for P1:
P1 optimal =
α∗1(y¯ − α2P2 − β2P ∗2 − u)− β1(y¯∗ − α∗2P ∗2 − β∗2P2 − z)
α1α∗1 − β1β∗1
(39)
P ∗1 optimal =
y¯∗−α∗2P∗2−β∗1( (y¯−α2P2−β1P
∗
1 −β2P
∗
2 −u)
α1
)−β∗2P2−z
α∗1
=
=
(
α1(y¯
∗−α∗2P
∗
2 −β
∗
2P2−z)−β
∗
1(y¯−α2P2−β2P
∗
2 −u)+β
∗
1β1P1
α1
)
α∗1
⇒
=
α1(y¯∗−α∗2P ∗2−β∗2P2−z)−β∗1 (y¯−α2P2−β2P ∗2−u)+β∗1β1P1
α1
· 1α∗1 ⇒
and solving for P ∗1 :
P ∗1 optimal =
α1(y¯∗ − α∗2P ∗2 − β∗2P2 − z)− β∗1(y¯ − α2P2 − β2P ∗2 − u)
α∗1α1 − β∗1β1
(40)
7.4 Two Countries Static Model for Domestic and Foreign
Optimal Monetary Policies in a parameters uncertainty
framework
We still adopt our two basic structural equations with n instruments (where
n=4):
y = α1P1 + α2P2 + β1P
∗
1 + β2P
∗
2 + u (41)
y∗ = α∗1P
∗
1 + α
∗
2P
∗
2 + β
∗
1P1 + β
∗
2P2 + z (42)
assuming the response coefficients to be random variables. Therefore y
and y∗ are random variables with variances given by:
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σ2y = σ
2
α 1P
2
1 + σ
2
α 2P
2
2 + σ
2
β 1P
∗2
1 σ
2
β 2P
∗2
2
+σ2u + 2ρσα 1σα 2P1P2 + 2ρσα 1σβ 1P1P
∗
1
+2ρσα 1σβ 2P1P
∗
2 + 2ρσα 2σβ 1P2P
∗
1
+2ρσα 2σβ 2P2P
∗
2 + 2ρσβ 1σβ 2P
∗
1P
∗
2
σ∗2y = σ
∗2
α 1P
∗2
1 + σ
∗2
α 2P
∗2
2 + σ
∗2
β 1P
2
1 σ
∗2
β 2P2
+σ2z + 2ρσ
∗
α 1σ
∗
α 2P
∗
1P
∗
2 + 2ρσ
∗
α 1σ
∗
β 1P
∗
1P1
+2ρσ∗α 1σ
∗
β 2P
∗
1P2 + 2ρσ
∗
α 2σ
∗
β 1P
∗
2P1
+2ρσ∗α 2σ
∗
β 2P
∗
2P2 + 2ρσ
∗
β 1σ
∗
β 2P1P2
where we also suppose that correlation between exogenous variables and
their respectively response coefficients in the equation does not exist. Our
uncertainty loss function can be rewritten as:
minP L = E[(y − y˜ + y˜ − y¯)2)] = E[σ2y + (y˜ − y¯)2)] (43)
minP ∗ L = E[(y
∗ − y¯∗)2] = E[σ∗2y + (y˜∗ − y¯∗)2)] (44)
Substituting then for y and y∗ and their respective variances σ2y and σ∗2y
we obtain:
L = E[σ2α 1P
2
1 + σ
2
α 2P
2
2 + σ
2
β 1P
∗2
1 + σ
2
β 2P
∗2
2
+σ2u + 2ρσα 1σα 2P1P2 + 2ρσα 1σβ 1P1P
∗
1 + 2ρσα 1σβ 2P1P
∗
2
+2ρσα 2σβ 1P2P
∗
1 + 2ρσα 2σβ 2P2P
∗
2 + 2ρσβ 1σβ 2P
∗
1P
∗
2
+(α˜1P1 + α˜2P2 + β˜1P
∗
1 + β˜2P
∗
2 + u˜− y¯)2]
L∗ = E[σ∗2α 1P
∗2
1 + σ
∗2
α 2P
∗2
2 + σ
∗2
β 1P
2
1 + σ
∗2
β 2P
2
2
+σ2z + 2ρσ
∗
α 1σ
∗
α 2P
∗
1P
∗
2 + 2ρσ
∗
α 1σ
∗
β 1P
∗
1P1 + 2ρσ
∗
α 1σ
∗
β 2P
∗
1P2
+2ρσ∗α 2σ
∗
β 1P
∗
2P1 + 2ρσ
∗
α 2σ
∗
β 2P
∗
2P2 + 2ρσ
∗
β 1σ
∗
β 2P1P2
+(α˜∗1P
∗
1 + α˜
∗
2P
∗
2 + β˜
∗
1P1 + β˜
∗
2P2 + z˜ − y¯∗)2]
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Thus, imposing the first order conditions:
∂L
∂P1
= 0⇒
⇒ 2(α˜1P1 + α˜2P2 + β˜1P ∗1 + β˜2P ∗2 + u˜− y¯)α˜1 + 2σ2α 1P1+
+2ρσα 1σα 2P2 + 2ρσα 1σβ 1P
∗
1 + 2ρσα 1σβ 2P
∗
2 = 0
∂L∗
∂P ∗1
= 0⇒
⇒ 2(α˜∗1P ∗1 + α˜∗2P ∗2 + β˜∗1P1 + β˜∗2P2 + z˜ − y¯∗)α˜∗1 + 2σ∗2α 1P ∗1 +
+2ρσ∗α 1σ∗α 2P ∗2 + 2ρσ∗α 1σ∗β 1P1 + 2ρσ
∗
α 1σ
∗
β 2P2 = 0
we end up with the following optimal policies:
P1 optimal =
α˜1(y¯ − α˜2P2 − β˜1P ∗1 − β˜2P ∗2 − u˜)− ρσα1σα2P2 − ρσα1σβ1P ∗1 − ρσα1σβ2P ∗2
(α˜21 + σ
2
α1)
(45)
P ∗1 optimal =
α˜∗1(y¯∗ − α˜∗1P ∗1 − β˜∗1P1 − β˜∗2P2 − z˜)− ρσ∗α1σ∗α2P ∗2 − ρσ∗α1σ∗β1P1 − ρσ∗α1σ∗β2P2
(α˜∗21 + σ∗2α1)
(46)
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